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When people think of computer hacking, they tend to think of some
fictional character sitting in their parent’s basement while they try to take
down some website through various “evil” coding methods. Hacking, as
covered by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), is actually
much more prevalent and could mean serious prison time for unsuspecting
employees. The CFAA is a federal law that both criminalizes and holds
people civilly liable when they “exceed[] authorized access.” Due to poor
drafting, circuits split on whether to read that language broadly and or
narrowly, meaning some defendants walk free while others face up to ten
years in prison. I argue the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari
in Nosal v. United States, and should adopt a broad interpretation of the
CFAA to hold people accountable for when they violate the intended-use
of information. I make two suggestions on how to modernize the CFAA to
keep up with the current pace of cybersecurity law. Finally, I propose
some steps employers can take now to protect their information in the
interim.
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OFFLINE

In the thirty years since the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”) became law, the number of the technological advancements
that have taken place is almost unquantifiable. Aimed at protecting people
against white-collar crime and the rise of hackers, the CFAA made
hacking and certain misuse of computers illegal.1
When the CFAA was introduced in the early 1980s, the federal
government was using approximately 18,000 computers.2 In contrast, in
March 2014, the Washington Post estimated that the federal government
now uses more than 4 million computers.3 The difference in the number
of computers alone shows the reliance on both the machines and the data
those machines make possible.
The CFAA both criminalizes certain behaviors and makes people
civilly liable for “exceeding authorized access” of a computer.4 The issue
came to Congress’ attention in the early 1980s when a group of Milwaukee
1

H. R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3690.
S. REP. NO. 99-432 at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2479.
3 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, Government computers running Windows XP
will be vulnerable to hackers after April 8, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 16, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/government-computers-runningwindows-xp-will-be-vulnerable-to-hackers-after-april-8/2014/03/16/9a9c8c7c-a55311e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html.
4 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (West 1986). The cases surrounding this Act range
from a police officer who improperly used a government database to a Major League
Baseball recruiter who hacked into the Houston Astros email system; See United States v.
Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015); See also The Associated Press, Christopher Correa,
Former Cardinals Executive, Sentenced to Four Years for Hacking Astros’ Database, N.Y.
TIMES (July 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/sports/baseball/christophercorrea-a-former-cardinals-executive-sentenced-to-four-years-for-hacking-astrosdatabase.html?_r=0.
2
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teenagers, known as the 414 Gang (after their area code), were able to hack
into a cancer treatment center.5 The teenagers gained access to records of
some 6,000 cancer patients and even had the ability to change radiation
treatment levels.6 The incident took a small financial toll on the center,
but the life-threatening nature of the hack caused the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary concern and led to the modern-day language of the
CFAA.7
The CFAA can be used to criminally prosecute someone or can be
used in a civil lawsuit.8 The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits claim that
the CFAA is much too vague to successfully prosecute or sue under,
except in very limited circumstances.9 Courts and scholars named this the
“narrow” interpretation because these courts utilize a more literal
interpretation of the CFAA language.10 In contrast, the First, Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use a “broad” interpretation of the CFAA
by construing the language as an intended-use analysis, making
prosecution and lawsuits more judicially feasible.11 This means that the
First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, interpret improper use of data
as actually exceeding authorized access.12
This Comment will analyze the purpose of the CFAA by quickly
dissecting the House of Representatives’ and the Senate’s approach to the
law in Part II. Then, this Comment will examine the circuit split, teasing
out the two different interpretations of the law and how those
interpretations create either a prosecution-friendly or plaintiff-friendly
jurisdiction versus a defendant-friendly jurisdiction. Next, in Part III, this
Comment will analyze the differing viewpoints of the varying
interpretations. Part IV will suggest two options for how to handle the
circuit split: an analysis of the current language and an explanation as to
why the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari, and in doing so,
why the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of
5

Will Storr, The kid hackers who starred in a real-life WarGames, TELEGRAPH (Sept.
16, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/film/the-414s/hackers-wargames-true-story/.
6 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3.
7 Storr, supra note 5; See also S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2480 (describing how the 414 Gang was a concern for the Senate when
deciding on the appropriate language for the CFAA).
8 See § 1030.
9 See infra Section II.C. See also § 1030. Specifically, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits operate under the assumption that improper data use is not exceeding authorized
access if the person did in fact have authorized access to the computer.
10 Am. Furukawa, Inc. v. Hossain, 103 F.Supp.3d 864, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
11 See infra Section II.D.
12 See infra Section II.D. See also Hossain, 103 F.Supp.3d at 871. This “broad”
interpretation is based on an intended-use analysis, meaning employees or competitors can
be prosecuted for using data in a manner not intended by the original source.
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the law. Alternatively, Part IV will put forth an argument that the CFAA
should be repealed and replaced with two different statutes: one for
criminal culpability with a separate section for offenders who are
government operatives, and another concerning civil liability.
II. BOOTING UP: BACKGROUND ON CFAA
The original language of the CFAA prohibited “accessing a computer
without authorization, or it [sic] authorized, abusing that authorization and
obtaining what generically is considered to be classified.”13 An
amendment switched that language to “exceeds authorized access.”14 The
chairperson of the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer
Crime suggested the switch after the original 1984 statute left many terms
undefined and confusing.15 This ambiguity, along with the evolving nature
of hacking and the need to comprehensively cover employees’ behavior,
resulted in the language’s change.16 The switch caused a rift among the
circuit courts in interpreting the Act.17 For the past thirty years, federal
courts battled with the language of “exceeds authorized access,” dividing
themselves into two distinct camps.18
A. How Do You Use This Thing? Congressional Action on Computer
Security
In 1983, the House of Representatives introduced a bill that would
eventually become the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.19 First,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.20 The
House Committee on the Judiciary found white-collar crimes were
neglected on both a federal and a state level.21 At the time, the only statutes
remotely dealing with cybersecurity were mail fraud or wire fraud.22
13

H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 21 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3707.
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat. 1213 PL 99–
474 (1986).
15 Dodd S. Griffith, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: A Measured
Response to a Growing Problem, 43 VAND. L. REV. 453, 470 (1990). Examples of terms
left undefined included: “access,” “authorization,” “affects” and “use”.
16 Id.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Section II.C-D.
19 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689.
20 Scott Eltringham, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., at 1
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
21 H. R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 4.
22 Id. at 6. Even if mail fraud or wire fraud would cover the alleged conduct, because
there was no specific framework of how to go about charging someone for a computerrelated crime these cases were treated as an “untested basis for prosecution.”
14
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The Senate also expressed concerns over the rise of hackers.23 After
passing the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Congress continued to
investigate potential computer crimes and possible statutory solutions.24
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary cited the 414 Gang incident as a
serious concern over the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act.25 After the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, the Justice
Department criticized the scope of the act as being too narrow because the
original version only protected a particular set of financial and credit
information.26
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Section
Task Force on Computer Crime suggested the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act needed to define terms such as “access,” “authorization,”
“affects,” and “use.”27 The Task Force also noted that while the terms
used in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act would cover hackers, the
terms were still too vague when dealing with employees.28 While
Congress wanted to protect employees who were using data appropriately,
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act provided almost no guidance on
how to handle the idea that employees could have access to data and still
“access without authorization,” as the original language stated.29 The Task
Force also wanted the Federal Bureau of Investigations to have primary
investigative jurisdiction because, at the time, the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act mainly covered government computers.30 Finally, the task
force wanted a civil remedies option because the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act did not have one.31
In 1986, the CFAA, as it is known today, passed with changes to
definitions, the scope of the Act, and an attempt to fix some of the
ambiguous language.32 Specifically, the Act’s language changed from “or
having accessed a computer without authorization” in the Comprehensive

23

S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479. Hackers
are generally defined as “[a] person who writes in assembly language or in system-level
languages,
such
as
C.”
Hacker,
PC
MAG,
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/44047/hacker. (last accessed Jan. 29, 2017).
However, hacker in this context is referring to someone who conducts “computer
sabotage.” Id.
24 Eltringham, supra note 20, at 1.
25 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3
26 Griffith, supra note 15, at 467.
27 Id.at 470.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 471.
31 Id.
32 Griffith, supra note 15, at 474.
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Crime Control Act to “or exceeds authorized access,” in the CFAA.33
Congress aimed at making the “cumbersome” language of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act simpler.34 The CFAA defines
“exceeds authorized use” as “access[ing] a computer with authorization
and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that
the accesser is not entitled to obtain or alter[.]”35 While this change
attempted to fix some of the problems of the previous Act, it has not been
enough to keep the courts from adopting drastically different
interpretations.
B. Ctrl +: How Cases Arise Under the CFAA and Practical Examples
The Department of Justice identifies three types of cases that arise
from the “exceeds authorized access” language.36 Practitioners dealing
with the CFAA would not know these “categories” as the Department of
Justice has named them, but, for clarity’s sake, this comment will refer to
cases by their category to give a firm example of how the CFAA arises
and how it is interpreted.37 First, when a person is prohibited from
accessing the information expressly; second, when a person has authorized
access to the information and is expressly forbidden from using the
information in certain ways, but the access of the information is not
conditioned on obeying the restrictions; and third, when a person has not
been commanded to avoid certain uses of the information but does so
against the authorizing party’s best interest.38
To better understand these three areas, consider the following: an
employee enters information into a database for work. If the employee
were to then access another program from another department, this would
be an example of the first situation.39 She was not given authorization and
then gained access anyway. For the second category, suppose a person
builds a program that will track the changes to a website and compiles that
information into a spreadsheet.40 Even though the website expressly
prohibits people from doing this, the website did not condition the person’s
access of the information on not using the information in a certain way.41
Finally, if an employee was given access to a certain database, and told to
not research personal interests in the database (say a neighbor’s billing
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2486.
18. U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(6) (West 1986).
Eltringham, supra, at 9-10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 9.
See generally id.
Id.
See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001).
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statement,) but does so anyway, this is an example of the third category of
cases.42 The third category of cases is more controversial because the
courts struggle with the narrow and broad interpretation of the CFAA
regarding employee’s access. A vast majority of cases used in this
Comment will be from that third category.43
C. Right Click: Narrow Interpretations
In May of 2012, New York City police officer Gilberto Valle logged
onto the Omnixx Force Mobile and searched for a woman he knew for
years.44 The program allows officers access to restricted databases, which
include private information, such as home addresses and birthdates, as
well as the federal National Crime Information Center database.45 Valle
used that information to discuss kidnapping the woman with another user
of the Dark Fetish Network—an Internet site for the sex-fetish
community.46 Valle had access to the Omnixx Force Mobile program for
his job as a New York City police officer.47 Valle’s misuse of the Omnixx
Force Mobile resulted in prosecutors charging Valle under the CFAA.48 A
jury found Valle guilty of violating the CFAA, but the Second Circuit
reversed this decision, calling the conviction “highly problematic”
because, while Valle was authorized to access the information, he was
using the information for unauthorized purposes.49 The Second Circuit
held the court should construe the statute narrowly so as not to
“unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals.”50 The Second
Circuit also hinted a broad construction could turn seemingly innocent
behavior, like checking one’s Facebook at work, into a punishable
offense.51 While Valle’s case may seem like an extreme use of the CFAA,
other circuits have also found interpreting the language to be difficult and
have followed the same narrow approach as the Second Circuit.

42

Id.
See supra Part II.C-D.
44 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2015).
45 Id.; see also “Cannibal Cop” Gilberto Vale found guilty of plot to kidnap, kill and
eat women, CBS NEWS, (May 12, 2013) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cannibal-copgilberto-valle-found-guilty-of-plot-to-kidnap-kill-and-eat-women/.
46 Valle, 807 F.3d at 512.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 523. In opening statements, Valle’s attorney argued he did not violate the
CFAA because, while Valle did violate the terms of his employment conducting the search,
he did not “obtain any information he was not entitled to obtain.”.
50 Id. at 527.
51 Id.
43
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The Fourth Circuit wrestled with interpreting the CFAA in WEC
Carolina Energy Solutions v. Miller.52 In that case, the defendant, Mike
Miller, and his assistant downloaded files from WEC Carolina Energy
Solutions (“WEC”) and then used those files at a new company to poach
a potential client from WEC.53 The Fourth Circuit held that while Miller
may have misappropriated the information, he did not exceed his
authorized access.54 The court reached this conclusion by relying on
WEC’s complaint, which stated Miller had access to intranet, WEC
servers, and confidential information.55 In conceding these points, WEC
essentially stated Miller had authorized access to confidential information,
which led to the dismissal of the claim.56
The Ninth Circuit used the narrow approach with its opinion in
United States v. Nosal I.57 In Nosal I, an employee, David Nosal,
convinced his coworkers to download confidential source lists for an
executive search firm.58 Nosal then left the company and started a
competing business.59 All of the employees at the firm were aware of the
company’s explicit policy forbidding use of the company’s confidential
information.60 Nosal was charged with aiding and abetting his former
coworkers to exceed their authorized access.61 The count was dismissed
by the district court after a motion for reconsideration.62 The court
reasoned “[t]here is simply no way” the definition of “exceeds authorized
access” was meant to include company policies. 63
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government’s argument
would make the CFAA too broad.64 The court also agreed with Nosal,
maintaining that the CFAA was only ever intended to be an anti-hacking
52

687 F.3d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 2012). WEC filed suit against Miller, claiming Miller
had violated the CFAA and exceeded his authorized use of the data from the files.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 207.
55 Id.
56 Id. The court used a narrow approach, which concluded an employee exceeds
authorized access by gaining access to information outside of his approved access; see also
Id. at 204. This meant that the court did not find an employee exceeded authorized access
when they improperly used such data.
57 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012). A judge in that opinion wrote: “Computers have
become an indispensable part of our daily lives. We use them for work; we use them for
play. Sometimes we use them for play at work”; See also generally LVRC Holdings LLC
v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining how the Ninth Circuit also used a
narrow interpretation in another employment case).
58 Nosal 676 F.3d at 856.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857.
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statute.65 The court advocated that a broad interpretation would “make
criminals of large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect
they are committing a federal crime.”66 The court argued a broad
construction of the CFAA would make seemingly innocent activities such
as instant messenger chatting or checking social media punishable simply
because those activities may be against company-wide computer-use
policies.67 Further, this could allow companies to improperly fire
employees because the company could threaten the employee with FBI
interference for misuse of company computers.68 Thus, a broad
construction could “invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”
because the employer-employee relationship would evolve from one
governed by tort and contract law to one governed by criminal law.69 On
May 5, 2017, Nosal petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.70
D. Left Click: Broad Interpretations
In contrast, while the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have
generally held the Act’s language should be read narrowly, the First, Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a plain-language reading.71
Instead, these four circuits use more of a reasonable-expectations test
when describing acceptable behavior under the CFAA. This test, best
described by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Phillips and United States
v. John, says that when a person exceeds the reasonable expectations of
the intended-use of the data, the person has violated the CFAA.72
To better explain this, the first major case that depicted a broader
interpretation of the CFAA and how it could affect data use comes from

65

Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
67 Id. at 860.
68 Id.
69 Id. In a subsequent proceeding regarding the prosecution of Nosal for conspiring
with his former coworkers to violate company policy, the Ninth Circuit vacated in part and
remanded the case to the district court because Nosal had by the “ordinary meaning” of
“without authorization” violated the CFAA. Id. at 869. The Ninth Circuit still maintained
that Nosal I was correctly decided because authorization was not an issue, as the coworkers
had authorization from the company despite the fact that they had clearly and admittedly
violated company policy. Id. at 874. The court reasoned that because Nosal instructed his
coworkers to break that company policy, he satisfied the necessary element of intent and
thus was a conspirator for violating the “without authorization” portion of the CFAA. Id.
at 880.
70 Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the day, SCOTUS BLOG (Jul. 11, 2017, 10:31 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/petitions-of-the-day-40/.
71 See infra Part IV.
72 See infra footnotes 82–97 and accompanying text (explaining the intended-use
analysis and how these circuits derive their interpretations).
66
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the First Circuit in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.73 Explorica,
a company founded in 2000, arranged global trips for students.74 The
company was a direct competitor to EF, which was the largest privatelyowned teen travel company in the world.75 Employees from EF left to join
Explorica and sought to undercut EF’s prices to take over the student travel
market.76 Part of Explorica’s strategy was to build a “scraper” that would
extensively search EF’s website for pricing on tour codes.77 Explorica
then used the information to undercut EF’s prices.78 After finding out
about the scraper during a separate lawsuit, EF was granted an injunction
against Explorica from using the scraper, and filed a lawsuit claiming
Explorica violated the CFAA.79
The First Circuit, in rendering its decision, did not decide whether
the use of a scraper would satisfy the CFAA’s language of “exceeds
authorized use.”80 Instead, the court found that because there was a broad
confidentiality agreement between the employee involved in this lawsuit
and EF, the employee exceeded authorized use when he contributed to the
development of the scraper and the subsequent use of the scraper on EF’s
website.81
This broad interpretation was better defined in United States v.
Phillips, a case involving Christopher Andrew Phillips, a freshman at the
University of Texas.82 Phillips signed a computer-use policy upon
matriculation, but shortly after starting school, Phillips began to steal data,
Eventually, Phillips stole “a veritable
including passwords.83
informational goldmine,” including bank account information, birth
73

274 F.3d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id.
75 Id. at 579.
76 Id.
77 Id. Scrapers are used on the Internet for search engines to filter content and find
information. Id. The difference with Explorica’s scraper is that the scraper only targeted
EF’s website, recording more than 30,000 inquiries and price information and then
tunneling that information into a comprehensive spreadsheet for Explorica. Id. Explorica
used the scraper twice, amassing 60,000 lines of data, which is equal to around eight
telephone directories. Id. at 580.
78 Id. at 579
79 Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d at 580. The court found that, because the employee
instructed a tech company how to decipher EF’s website and find the tour codes, the
employee had exceeded the authorized use of EF’s website. Id. at 583. The employee
attempted to argue that all of the information was available on EF’s website; however, the
court found the employee exceeded his authorized used because of the language of a
contract he signed: “which might reasonably be construed to be contrary to the interests of
EF.” Id.
80 Id. at 581.
81 Id.
82 477 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2007).
83 Id.
74
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records, and Social Security numbers.84 Despite warnings, Phillips used a
“‘brute-force attack’ program” to steal up to six Social Security numbers
per second.”85 A jury convicted Phillips under the CFAA, and he received
five years’ probation, five-hundred community service hours, and
restitution in the amount of $170,056, which he subsequently appealed.86
The Fifth Circuit used an intended-use test to determine if Phillips
violated the CFAA when he used the university’s computer system to
gather data.87 In doing so, the court stated that the CFAA should be read
broadly to determine whether or not the access exceeded authorization.88
To establish that, a court must first determine if a reasonable person would
understand that what they were doing was outside of what the website’s
owner intended.89
The Fifth Circuit further clarified the aforementioned analysis in
United States v. John.90 In that case, the defendant, Dimetriace Eva-Lavon
John, was an account manager at Citigroup.91 Through her position, John
had access to customer account information.92 John gave her half-brother
printouts of screenshots of customer information and eventually gathered
the confidential information of at least seventy-six corporate customers.93
John’s half-brother used that information to incur fraudulent charges
against four of those corporate customers.94 John tried to argue that she
did not violate the CFAA when she accessed the customer’s data because
she was authorized to use Citigroup’s computers and accessing that data
was a part of her job.95 The First Circuit again used the intended-use
analysis to reason that what John did was in fact a violation of the CFAA:
To give but one example, an employer may “authorize” employees to
84

Id.
Id. at 218. The attack cost the university close to $200,000 to assess the damage and
notify victims. Id. It was estimated over the fourteen-month attack that Phillips gained
access to 45,000 people’s information, but claimed he never intended to use or sell the
information. Id.
86 Id. at 218–19.
87 Id. at 219. Phillips attempted to argue that because the university’s website was a
public application, he was an authorized user. Id. at 220. In making their decision, the
court reasoned that, while anyone could type the URL for the university’s website into the
search bar, the university had to grant access for individual users and that created a
contractual relationship that Phillips violated. Id.
88 Phillips, 477 F.3d at 219.
89 Id. at 219-220.
90 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).
91 Id. at 269.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 271. In a parsing of the statute, John argued the CFAA does not cover the
actual use of the information but instead only covers accessing, obtaining, or altering data
she was not authorized to obtain. Id.
85
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utilize computers for any lawful purpose but not for unlawful purposes and
only in furtherance of the employer’s business. An employee would
“exceed [ ] authorized access” if he or she used that access to obtain or
steal information as part of a criminal scheme.96 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that because she was authorized to access the information for
limited purposes only and understood that as a part of her job description,
John thus exceeded authorized access when she used the information
outside of the scope of her employment.97
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit furthered the implications of the
intended-use analysis by finding that merely accessing the information
would violate the CFAA.98 In United States v. Rodriguez, Roberto
Rodriguez worked for the Social Security Administration and had access
to Social Security numbers, addresses, birthdates, and other information
due to the nature of his job.99 Rodriguez refused to sign acknowledgment
forms about policies regarding the databases.100 It was through this
monitoring that the Administration flagged Rodriguez’s access and told
Rodriguez that the Administration was conducting a criminal
investigation.101 Rodriguez claimed he was conducting a whistleblowing
expedition to see if the Administration would notice his unauthorized
use.102 Rodriguez was sentenced to one year in prison and one year of
supervised release.103 Rodriguez relied upon United States v. John, saying
that only the use of the information would be a crime; the court, however,
corrected Rodriguez, finding that because he conceded he had exceeded
his authorized use, it did not matter what purpose Rodriguez had for the
information.104 The court also noted that it did not matter that Rodriguez
did not use the information to defraud or for financial gain.105 Simply
exceeding his authorized use was enough to convict Rodriguez
criminally.106

96

John, 597 F.3d at 271.
Id. at 272.
98 See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).
99 Id. at 1260. On numerous occasions, Rodriguez accessed information of former
girlfriends, family members, and random strangers, going as far as to use the information
to wish someone a “happy half-birthday.” Id. at 1261.
100 Id. The Social Security Administration asserted that to make sure employees were
following the policies, it gave individualized identification numbers and passwords and
monitored the employee’s access and compliance with policy. Id.
101 Id. at 1260.
102 Id. at 1262.
103 Id.
104 Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.
105 Id.
106 Id.
97
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E. Force Quit: The Call for Reform
In 2010, Aaron Swartz, a co-founder of the popular website Reddit,
was indicted for “attempting to download all of the electronically archived
materials maintained by JSTOR while accessing them through a computer
network operated by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(“MIT”).”107 Swartz allegedly downloaded millions of articles from
JSTOR, a digital library boasting more than 2,300 academic journals and
historical information, and then released the documents so that anyone
could read and interpret them.108 On January 11, 2013, Swartz committed
suicide.109 If Swartz had been convicted, he could have faced up to thirtyfive years in prison.110
Some called Swartz’s actions political activism and used the
indictment and subsequent suicide as proof that the reach of the CFAA
needs curtailing.111 As a result, in June 2013, Representative Zoe Lofgren
of California introduced H.R. 2454, commonly known as “Aaron’s
Law.”112 The law would amend the CFAA to strike the phrase “exceeds
authorized access” and instead replace it with the phrase “access without
authorization.”113
The amended CFAA would define “access without authorization” as:
“(A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) that the accesser
lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or
more technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or
prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining that information.”114
These amendments would imply that violations of terms of service or
acceptable use policies would not qualify as exceeding authorized

107 United States v. Swartz, 945 F.Supp.2d 216, 217 (D. Mass. 2013); See also
Josephine Wolff, The Hacking Law That Can’t Hack It, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2016, 11:15 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/09/the_computer_fraud_and
_abuse_act_turns_30_years_old.html.
108 Peter Eckersley, Farewell to Aaron Swartz, an Extraordinary Hacker and Activist,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND
(Jan.
12,
2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/farewell-aaron-swartz. See also New to JSTOR?
Learn More About Us, JSTOR http://about.jstor.org/10things.
109 Id.
110 Eckersley, supra note 107.
111 Id.
112 Aaron’s Law Act of 2013, H.R. 2454, 113th Cong. (2013).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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access.115 The law did not pass in 2013 and failed to become codified law
when reintroduced in 2015.116
Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, who has also proposed an amendment
to the CFAA, criticized Aaron’s Law, claiming it would decriminalize
insider hacking.117 Major technology and software companies, such as
Oracle, Adobe, and the Software and Information Industry Association,
oppose changing the CFAA with such mechanisms as Aaron’s Law.118
Oracle alone spent $1.5 million for each quarter in 2013 for lobbying
efforts to stop Congress from passing Aaron’s Law because the broad
language makes litigation more favorable to companies.119
F. Restart: Texas’ Version of the CFAA
On December 31, 1984, Texas State Senator Ray Farabee introduced
Senate Bill No. 72, a bill “relating to the creation of offenses involving
breach of computer security.”120 The bill later passed on May 25, 1985,
following administrative and substantive changes.121 Senator Farabee
recognized the importance of computers, citing the difference between
personal computer sales in 1976 and 1982: none and $1 billion,
respectively.122 At the time the bill was introduced, thirty-five states had
computer crime bills on the books. 123
115

See Wolff, supra note 107. Terms of service is described by PC Magazine as rules
a person or organization must follow in order to use a service. See also Terms of Service,
PC MAG, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/62682/terms-of-service. They are
legally binding unless the terms violate federal or local law. Id. Websites that store
personal data for the user have terms of services like social media sites or “financial
transaction sites.” Id. In contrast, an acceptable use policy is a policy that describes
prohibited behaviors, like spamming.
Acceptable use policy, PC MAG,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/37376/acceptable-use-policy. These policies
can also be found at schools or universities for access to a computer lab or database, for
example. Id.
116 See Id. Due to the manner in which Swartz downloaded the files from JSTOR, the
proposed language may not have protected Swartz. Id.
117 Sheldon Whitehouse, Hacking into the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: The CFAA
at 30: Keynote, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2016). By using a terms of service
approach for breaching authorization, Aaron’s Law would still make behaviors like logging
into your spouse’s Facebook or getting around a paying for access to an Internet site by
clearing your cookies illegal behavior, Whitehouse claims. Id.
118 Fruzsina Eördögh, Silicon Valley is Stonewalling Efforts to Amend the Law
Imprisoning
Hacktivists,
VICE
(July
16,
2014
3:51
PM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/silicon-valley-is-stonewalling-efforts-to-amend-thelaw-imprisoning-hacktivists.
119 Id.
120 S.B. No. 72, 69th R.S. (Tx. 1985), 1-2.
121 See generally S.B. NO. 72, supra note 120.
122 Id. at 5.
123 Id. These states included: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
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The current language of Texas Penal Code § 33.02 “Breach of
Computer Security” reads as follows: “(a) A person commits an offense if
the person knowingly accesses a computer, computer network, or
computer system without the effective consent of the owner.124 Part (b-1)
makes the scope of the offense very clear:
A person commits an offense if, with the intent to defraud or harm
another or alter, damage, or delete property, the person knowingly
accesses: (1) a computer, computer network, or computer system without
the effective consent of the owner; or (2) a computer, computer network,
or computer system: (A) that is owned by: (i) the government; or (ii) a
business or other commercial entity engaged in a business activity; (B) in
violation of: (i) a clear and conspicuous prohibition by the owner of the
computer, computer network, or computer system; or (ii) a contractual
agreement to which the person has expressly agreed; and (C) with the
intent to obtain or use a file, data, or proprietary information stored in the
computer, network, or system to defraud or harm another or alter, damage,
or delete property.125
There are only two defenses within the Texas Penal Code § 33.02:
legitimate law enforcement purposes and when someone contracts to
provide computer security.126 Texas has also codified the same law as a
civil claim in Section 143.001 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code.127
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
124 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02(a) (West 1985).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 143.001 (West 1989). “A person who is
injured or whose property has been injured as a result of a violation under Chapter 33,
Penal Code, has a civil cause of action if the conduct constituting the violation was
committed knowingly or intentionally.” Id. The definitions for the Texas statute define
access as “approach[ing], instruct[ing], communicat[ing] with, stor[ing] data in,
retriev[ing] or intercept[ing] data from, alter[ing] data or computer software in, or
otherwise mak[ing] use of any resource of a computer, computer network, computer
program, or computer system.” TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 33.01(1) (West 1985). The statute
also defines the terms computer, computer network, computer program, or computer
system. Ann. § 33.01(4)(5)(6)(8) (West 1985). Computer is defined as “an electronic,
magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing device that
performs logical, arithmetic, or memory functions by the manipulations of electronic or
magnetic impulses and includes all input, output, processing, storage, or communication
facilities that are connected or related to the device.” Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.01
(4) (West 1985). Computer network is “the interconnection of two or more computers or
computer systems by satellite, microwave, line, or other communication medium with the
capability to transmit information among the computers.” Id.; Ann. § 33.01 (5) (West
1985). A computer program is defined as “means an ordered set of data representing coded
instructions or statements that when executed by a computer cause the computer to process
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III. FROM DIALUP TO WIFI: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE CFAA IN
THE MODERN AGE

With a variety of interpretations from seven circuits, it is difficult to
see how a company or a prosecutor should handle an allegation of a
violation of the CFAA.128 Mere miles across a state line can mean the
difference between jail time and walking free due to broad
interpretations.129 This growing strife between interpretations and the dire
consequences created a variety of opinions and options of where the
CFAA may go next.
A. Password Required: A Look at the Different Opinions on the CFAA
In an interview with Slate.com, Former New Jersey Representative
William J. Hughes stated that Congress was trying to create a law that
would help solve future problems when it developed the CFAA.130 He
stated that, “We were attempting to anticipate the problems that surely
would evolve over time . . . .”131 Representative Hughes analogized that
since there were laws on the books that protect breaking into a home,
Congress should also try to prevent theft of information stored on
computers.132 As the use of the CFAA has transitioned over the years, it
is clear that some courts favor a broad interpretation of the law while
others favor a narrower one.133 Opponents of the CFAA point to the
inconsistencies with interpretations and the range in punishments as
support for reform.134 Specifically, opponents are looking for “narrower
definitions, gentler punishments, and clearer exceptions carved out for
security researchers.”135 Meanwhile, Representative Hughes is calling for
the exact opposite: “I suspect that we may have to go back and broaden
the statute even more to make sure that we’re catching everything and
everyone we should be.”136 He cites the CFAA as essential for protecting
property in the age of cyber attacks.137
data or perform specific functions.” Id.; § 33.01 (6) (West 1985). Finally, a computer
system is “any combination of a computer or computer network with the documentation,
computer software, or physical facilities supporting the computer or computer network.”
§ 33.01 (8) (West 1985).
128 See supra Part II B-C.
129 Michael L. Levy, A Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 – The Problem of
Employee Theft, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1591, 1593 (2016).
130 Wolff, supra note 107.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Wolff, supra note 107.
137 Id.

2017]

Eject the Floppy Disk

35

A group of academic researchers and journalists attempted to reform
the second category of cases in the summer of 2016.138 With the help of
the American Civil Liberties Union, the researchers filed a complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relief against Attorney General Loretta Lynch,
alleging that the CFAA makes violating a terms of service agreement a
crime.139 The plaintiffs in the case claim that they pose online as people
of different races to research potential discrimination in hiring and housing
practices.140 By claiming to be people they are not, the plaintiffs are
violating the terms of service and could be prosecuted under the CFAA.141
The complaint points out that even the Justice Department’s manual on the
CFAA states that “exceeds authorized access” is: [R]elatively easy to
prove that a defendant had only limited authority to access a computer in
cases where the defendant’s access was limited by restrictions that were
memorialized in writing, such as terms of service [or] a website
notice . . . .142
Reform efforts are also underway in the third category of cases with
the sentencing of Matthew Keys. Keys was a former Reuters employee
who gave members of the hacker group “Anonymous” login information
for the Tribune Media.143 Upon obtaining this information, Anonymous
altered a headline on a story on the LA Times website, which was live on
the Tribune Media website for about forty minutes.144 Those forty minutes
turned into a two-year sentence for Keys, who was convicted of violating
the CFAA for giving his information to Anonymous.145 Again, Keys did
not post the headline himself, but merely shared his login information.146
The eight-word headline allegedly cost Tribune Media $929,977 in
When convicted, Keys tweeted out, “That was
defacement.147
bullsh**.”148

138

Complaint at 1, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 1:16-cv-1368 (JDB) (D.D.C. June 29, 2016).
Id.
140 Id. at 4.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 8.
143 Kate Conger, Journalist Matthew Keys sentenced to 2 years in hacking case, TECH
CRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/04/13/matthew-keys-sentencedunder-cfaa/.
144 Conger, supra note 143.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Cat Zakrzewski, Journalist Mathew Keys Found Guilty on Hacking Charges, Tech
Crunch (Oct. 7, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/07/journalist-matthew-keysfound-guilty-on-hacking-charges/.
139
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B. Do You Wish to Debug? Ideas on What Happens Next
The American Bar Association suggested that repealing the CFAA
would not be a total blow to either the criminal or civil realms.149 For
example, if the CFAA were repealed, Prosecutors could continue to look
to the federal trade-secrets statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1832.150 That trade-secret
statute was critical in cases like WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v.
Miller.151 Trade secret charges may be the best alternative route for
prosecutors to charge defendants with, as it is more narrowly tailored to
target people who “knowingly [and] without authorization cop[y],
duplicate . . . download, upload, destroy, . . . transmit, deliver, . . . or
convey such information . . . ” for an economic benefit.152 If someone
violates the statute, they can be convicted for up to ten years in prison.153
A violation of the federal trade secret law covers at least in part what
legislators set out to do with the CFAA.
In terms of civil alternatives, employers have other avenues available
through a variety of claims.154 Employers could easily bring claims of
“breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, tortious
interference with an economic advantage, unfair competition, or
misappropriation of trade secrets.”155
In 2011, Professor Michael Risch from Villanova University’s
Charles Widger School of Law posted in a blog about the “scary”
implications of the CFAA and interpretations.156 In dissecting the 2011
ruling in United States v. Nosal, Risch suggested that the CFAA could be
fixed by requiring a two-part standard for the CFAA.157 First, an action
under the CFAA must be tied to an independent wrongful action; for
example, trade secret misappropriation.158 Second, that wrongful action
would need to be tied to exceeding authorized access.159
149 Aaron M. Danzig & Matthew A.S. Esworthy, Glitches Within the CFAA’s “Exceeds
Authorized
Access”
Language,
A.B.A.
(Oct.
9,
2013)
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/criminal/articles/summer2013-1013glitches-within-cfaas-exceeds-authorized-access-language.html.
150 Id.
151 See 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012).
152 18 U.S.C § 1832(a)(2) (1996).
153 § 1832(a).
154 Danzig & Esworthy, supra note 149, at 21.
155 Id.
156 Michael Risch, When the Right Interpretation of the Law is a Scary One (CFAA
Edition), Madisonian (Apr. 18, 2011) http://madisonian.net/2011/04/28/when-the-rightinterpretation-of-the-law-is-a-scary-one-cfaa-edition/.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. Risch put it best when he wrote: “In other words, lying about your age shouldn’t
affect access rights generally, but lying about your age might very well be a problem if the
reason you did so was to prey on young children.” Id.
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Another suggestion would be to reject both of the circuits analyses
and instead akin authorization to a physical trespass with similar
elements.160 This would require a prosecutor or a plaintiff to prove three
elements to be successful: (1) access violating an express or implied
prohibition; (2) the alleged violator knew or should have known about the
prohibition; (3) and, the prohibition would be “material or related to the
underlying policy of trespass.”161 The second element breaks down into
three subcategories to prove knowledge of the prohibition: a code-based
approach, a notification approach, and a social norm approach.162 A codebased approach, like a password, would be required if the computer’s
owner had some sort of program to stop access and the user knew they
were exceeding their authorization.163 Another approach could be a
notification that certain access is unauthorized, like a disclaimer or a terms
of service post.164 The last type of knowledge to show a user knew or
should have known they violated their terms of access would be a social
norm approach.165 An example would be a hacker continuously accessing
a website with a program that shuts down the website’s server.166 While
the hacker was authorized to visit the site, social norms would suggest the
hacker was not authorized to visit the site in such an aggressive manner to
shut the site down.167
There are inherent problems with this physical trespass approach.
While a code-based approach to understanding whether or not the user
should have known their access exceeded authorization would seem to be
a simple solution, consider the following scenario from Michael L. Levy,
the Chief of Computer Crimes for the United States Attorney’s office in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.168 One employee asks another to
login to his computer at work while he is away so she can relay some
information.169 From a code-based approach, the second employee would
not know or have reason to know that they had exceeded authorized
access.170 If that same employee then guessed the first employee’s
160 Josh Goldfoot & Aditya Bamzai, A Trespass Framework for the Crime of Hacking,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1477, 1483 (2016).
161 Id. at 1483.
162 Id. at 1487–94.
163 Id. at 1487.
164 Id. at 1490.
165 Id. at 1493. This approach suggests the user would know their access was prohibited
because “social norms, or conventions, with which the defendant was familiar, demand the
conclusion.” Id.
166 Goldfoot & Bamzai supra note 160, at 1493.
167 Id.
168 Levy, supra note 129, at 1603.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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password and used it, they would still not have violated a code-based
approach.171 This is because they were able to overcome the code of the
program and still access the information.172 Thus, there was nothing
impeding the second employee’s access.173
Also, the notification approach poses an issue to the physical trespass
approach. Lawyers spend hundreds of hours drafting terms of service
agreements that are rarely read or contemplated until someone has a
problem with the website.174 Therefore, the notification is not actually
effective because the user does not have actual notice, just constructive
notice. For example, if a person tweaks his or her dating profile to make
his or herself seem more interesting by saying he or she has traveled to
Paris but does not qualify that statement as Paris, Texas, that person has
violated a notification approach.175 Another example of a violation of a
notification approach would be providing the wrong phone number or
email address to avoid unwanted marketing.176 These seemingly harmless
activities would violate a notification approach even though they are not
malicious or criminal in society’s view.177
Lastly, the social-norm approach toward determining knowledge
proves difficult in the changing way people use technology.178 In Judge
Reinhart’s Nosal II dissent, he pointed out that today password sharing is
the norm.179 In fact, Judge Reinhart said the CFAA “does not make the
millions of people who engage in this ubiquitous, useful, and generally
harmless conduct into unwitting federal criminals.”180 Instead, he
concluded that the CFAA was not meant to cover the everyday sharing of
passwords such as with Netflix.181 Because so many people engage in
password sharing, it is hard for people to conceptualize that they are
violating a social norm in the process. Although parents of adolescents
everywhere may hate it, the excuse “everyone’s doing it” makes sense for
a social-norm approach. While perhaps one of the other two notification
approaches would cover this type of behavior, the social-norm approach
is problematic when certain behaviors become commonplace.

171

Id. at 1603–04.
Id. at 1604.
173 Id.
174 Whitehouse, supra note 117, at 1438.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See infra Part II.C.
179 United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), 828 F.3d 865, 888 (9th Cir. 2016), opinion
amended, reh’g denied, 016 WL 7190670 (9th Cir. 2016).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 889.
172
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Another approach to fixing the problems with the CFAA includes
amending the language, like that of Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and
Senator Lindsey Graham’s July 2015 proposal.182 The amendment would
replace the language of the CFAA to “intentionally access[ing] a protected
computer without authorization and thereby obtain[ing] information from
or caus[ing] damage to any such protected computer.”183 However, the
proposed amendment uses “protected computer,” and calls for the same
definition currently in the CFAA.184 That definition is narrow and would
only protect government computers or those used for interstate or foreign
commerce.185 For example, unless an employer is the United States
government, a financial institution, or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, the amendment does not cover a situation in which someone
stole information from their employer.186 While the phrase interstate
commerce could be stretched to almost any situation, without a more clear
definition of the type of information this amendment would protect, this
amendment leaves the CFAA weaker, rather than stronger than before.
IV. CLICK HERE TO AGREE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CFAA CRISIS
In order to fix the CFAA to provide a more uniform approach, the
Supreme Court could grant certiorari and give courts a uniform
interpretation, or Congress could pass an amendment to the CFAA,
providing better definitions and context on how the CFAA should be used.
A. System Override: The Supreme Court Option
The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in Nosal v. United
States to answer the question concerning whether the CFAA should be

182

Levy, supra note 129, at 1607.
Id. The rest of the amendment reads: “(B) accesses a protected computer with
authorization and thereby knowingly obtains information from such computer that the
accessor is not entitled to obtain, or knowingly obtains any information from such
computer for a purpose that the accessor knows is prohibited by the computer owner, if (i) the value of the information obtained exceeds [$ 10,000]; (ii) [the conduct was
undertaken in furtherance of any felony violation of the laws of the United States or of any
State, unless an element of such violation would require proof that the information was
obtained without authorization or in excess of authorization;] or (iii) the protected
computer is owned or operated by or on behalf of a State or local governmental entity
responsible for the administration of justice, public health, or safety, or of the United States
Government; and (C) the limitation on access to or use of the information is not based
solely on the terms of a contractual obligation or agreement, such as an acceptable use
policy or terms of service agreement, between a provider of online service and a customer
or subscriber thereof.” Id.
184 Id.
185 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(2) (West 1986).
186 See supra Section II.D.
183
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interpreted in a broad or a narrow manner.187 Unfortunately, on October
7, 2017, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.188 Nosal was ideal because
it fit into the third category in which the CFAA normally arises; when an
employee takes data from their employer and then uses that data for their
own gain.189 The first category, when someone is hacking or stealing
information, would cause less of a controversy under the current language
of the CFAA because that type of behavior would fall into the
unauthorized access portion of the CFAA.190 Alternatively, the second
category, essentially exceeding the terms of service or an acceptable use
policy, would benefit from a more definitive answer, but since those types
of cases rarely arise, an interpretation for the third category would cover
this second category.191
United States v. Nosal, was a perfect example of the type of case the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari for, as it involves an employee who
took his work-granted privileges and used them in a manner not intended
by their employer.192 Nosal took confidential information from his
employer so he could start his own firm in the same business.193 A
Supreme Court decision would have been helpful because deciding an
interpretation for the CFAA should be all-encompassing. Then, the
Supreme Court should interpret the CFAA in a broad sense like the First,
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.194
The CFAA was passed as a way to combat a new type of crime in an
age when the impact of computers and the data they could create and store
was not fully comprehensible.195 Even so, the principle behind the CFAA
remains the same: to protect information stored electronically.196 Under a
broad interpretation, the CFAA can do just that. By looking at the
individual circumstance, a court should answer just one question: would a
reasonable person understand that what the accused was doing was outside
of the intended-use of the access granted?197 This would allow the
government and companies to protect their information, which is at the
187 Aurora Barnes, Petitions of the day, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 11, 2017, 10:31 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/petitions-of-the-day-40.
188 Docket,
United
States
v.
Nosal,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/161344.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
189 See supra Section II.B.
190 See Id.
191 See Id.
192 See supra Section II.D.
193 See Id.
194 See Id.
195 See supra Section II.A.
196 See Id.
197 See supra Section II.D.
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heart of the CFAA. By following this analysis, a court would almost
always come down in favor of the government or a company. While this
may seem harsh, the purpose of the CFAA is clear.198 Congress intended
to protect data and, in a digital age, there can be no loopholes.
B. Rewiring the CFAA: A Suggested New Approach
If the Supreme Court does not eventually grant certiorari and
Congress instead decides to amend the CFAA, there are three major
considerations. First, Congress should emphasize data rather than
computers in any amendment. Second, Congress should seek to fully
define all aspects of an amendment, creating one interpretation of the law
for courts to follow. Finally, Congress should consider bifurcating the
civil and criminal aspects of any amendment.
First, Congress should amend the CFAA in title and scope to focus
on what they are actually trying to protect: data. The CFAA is not truly
concerned with the desktop or laptop computer on every employee’s
desk.199 Nor is the CFAA aimed at the cellphone in the pocket of almost
every American with a smartphone.200 The CFAA is aimed at protecting
data.201 This slight tweak covers the information stored electronically and
is a better descriptor at the root of the litigation. If an employee were to
walk out of the office with the intent to steal their work computer, it would
be theft. If the employee were to take the information from the computer,
they are only stealing the data. This data is the root of the three categories
of cases involving the CFAA. Hackers do not hack computers to steal
equipment; they do so to steal data. One potential definition of data comes
from Texas’ version of the CFAA.202 While not the most updated version,
this definition does encompass the purpose of the law rather than
computer.
“Data” means a representation of information, knowledge, facts,
concepts, or instructions that is being prepared or has been prepared in a
formalized manner and is intended to be stored or processed, is being
stored or processed, or has been stored or processed in a computer. Data
may be embodied in any form, including but not limited to computer

198

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
200 Mobile Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center, PEW INTERNET (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/. The Pew Research Center found seventyseven percent of Americans own a smartphone. Id. In 2011, that number was just thirtyfive percent in 2011. Id.
201 See supra Section II.A.
202 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.02 (West 1985).
199
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printouts, magnetic storage media, laser storage media, and punchcards,
or may be stored internally in the memory of the computer.203
Second, Congress should amend the CFAA with a new definition of
“exceeds authorized access.” Alternatively, Congress should adopt a
version of the CFAA similar to Texas’s law since Texas’ law fully
encompasses all three categories of CFAA cases.204 If Congress were to
re-define “exceeds authorized access,” using the broad interpretation of
“whether a reasonable person would understand what the accused was
doing was outside of the intended-use of the access granted,” courts could
apply a more uniform approach to CFAA cases across all three categories.
This would still come with the problems under the second category
mentioned above.205 Alternatively, by adopting a statute similar to Texas’,
all three categories would be managed in a more uniform manner. Texas’
law is focused on both hackers and employees, both private and
government, who use information in an unintended way.206 Specifically,
section (b-1) covers the first and third category of cases completely,
making it a crime to both hack and take information from an employer.207
By further describing what the person intended to do in (b-1)(C),
employees who accidentally access information would not be subject to
prosecution.208 This interpretation would also limit the second category of
cases because of the narrow intent definition. With this definition,
researchers, like those of the ACLU tracking possible discriminatory
practices, would not be subject to prosecution.209 Instead, Texas’ language
sets out narrow parameters that would encompass the purpose the CFAA
is trying to protect in a way that would favor a more uniform interpretation.
Finally, the CFAA currently has the same standard for both a
criminal and civil application. In Texas, the civil component of the CFAA
law lowers the mens rea standard to knowingly or intentionally. This
allows those who want to sue under Texas’s version of the CFAA an
opportunity to recover if the conduct does not rise to the same level as the
intent under (b-1)(2)(C). Congress should consider bifurcation of the
criminal and civil standard in any future amendments to offer protection
of the same conduct that does not rise to the level of criminal culpability.
This would further Congress’ justification for the statute while still

203

Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.01(11) (West 1985).
See supra Section II.B.
205 See Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577; Eltringham, supra note 20, at 9-10 (explaining
how cases involving the CFAA arise).
206 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.02 (West 1985).
207 Id.
208 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 33.02 (West 1985).
209 See supra Section III.A.
204
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delineating the difference between conduct that should be penalized with
prison time or not.
C. Error Message: Authority not Found
Even without a definitive answer as to which analysis courts should
use or what amendments should be adopted, there are steps employers can
take to protect themselves against litigation.210 First, employers can draft
comprehensive polices that explicitly delineate the appropriate access
standards for employees to avoid litigation.211 Next, employers could
invest in computer systems that allow access to be broken down to
different levels.212 This would allow employers to keep employees from
gaining access to data that they do not need to complete their tasks.213
Employers also need plans in place for when employees leave.214 This
would include terminating remote access and making sure employees
return all work-issued devices with access to any employer-related
network.215 Finally, employers should reiterate that employees are not to
continue to access the work networks after their work is complete and they
leave the company.216
V. UNPLUGGING
The issues with the CFAA will not disappear or become any less
relevant. Instead, the differences between the interpretations will only
continue to increase as technology continues to advance. While the
parsing of words and individual circumstances make the CFAA tedious,
the CFAA was intended to protect Americans in a way that no other law
can do. The CFAA will only continue to become more important.
Congress needs to amend the law as quickly as possible so the unbalanced
prosecution of citizens can be leveled. If Congress does not act, eventually
the Supreme Court needs to grant certiorari to determine an interpretation.
The law needs to be used as it was intended instead of resulting in an

210

Barbara A. Neider & Joseph S. Diedrich, Not Authorized! Employees and Computer
Fraud, 89 WIS. LAW. 22 (2016).
211 Id.
212 Id. For example, there are different levels of security clearances for the Federal
Bureau of Investigations. Security Clearances for Law Enforcement, FBI.gov
https://www.fbi.gov/resources/law-enforcement/security-clearances-for-law-enforcement
(last accessed Jan. 29, 2017). These clearance levels keep people from being able to access
certain information, something employers may want to look into for all employees. Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Neider & Diedrich, supra note 210 at 22.
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unequal playing field that defendants are currently a victim of — some
courts punishing the same acts other deem acceptable.

